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Doing Business in Vietnam 
 
Abstract  
Over the last thirty years, Vietnam evolved from “war after war” to an emerging 
economy with an attractive foreign investment policy and commitment to a liberalized 
economy. Although the GDP per capita is still considerably lower than in the Asian Tiger 
economies, and the institutional framework still reflects inheritances from the central plan 
system, Vietnam today has a vibrant economy with small businesses springing up at every 
street corner. Foreign investors have been flogging to Vietnam since the early 1990s, with a 
new peak of FDI inflow in 2004. This paper reviews the Vietnamese economy, society, 
culture, and policies towards foreign investment to inform those considering to invest in 
Vietnam, and to provide some practical advice.  
 
Introduction  
Vietnam is rapidly emerging as a new center of economic growth in South-east Asia. 
Foreign investors seek business opportunities in both the domestic market of over 80 million 
potential consumers, and in low cost production sites. North American and European 
investors are in particular eyeing the domestic markets while investors from neighboring 
countries such as Taiwan are to a higher degree using Vietnam as an export base. 
Vietnam’s young population – 95% are younger than 65 – is eager to explore Western 
consumer goods, and present a huge potential market for foreign investors. The high 
economic growth of the 1990’s, on average 7.3% annually, is expected to continue, 
suggesting an even larger market in the future. (Statistics Publishing House, 2004). 
International integration, notably the membership in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), 
and the anticipated membership in the WTO facilitate access to this attractive market.  
At the same time, Vietnam is emerging as a major export platform. The country is 
gaining competitive advantages for labor-intensive production processes on the basis of low 
general wage levels. Productivity of the workforce is high as Vietnamese employees have a 
reputation for being hard working and ambitious. On this basis, Vietnam has build major 
export-oriented operations based on labor-intensive manufacturing, notably in the garment, 
footwear and furniture industries. Moreover, Vietnamese are typically strong in natural 
sciences, relative to others in the ASEAN region, which provides a solid basis for future 
expansion into high technology industries. It is also endowed with favorable conditions for 
certain agricultural commodities, such as rice, coffee, spices, seafood and fruits that have 
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developed into major export crops in recent years. In recent years, Vietnam has moved to 
realize its competitive advantages to generate exports by lowering or removing both self-
imposed and externally levied tariff and other trade barriers, and by joining bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements.  
This paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines the recent developments 
of institutions and the macro-economy of Vietnam. Section 3 focuses on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) outlining recent trends and investment strategies, illustrated by short case 
studies. Section 4 reviews operational challenges arising from cultural differences. Section 5 
briefly comments on US-Vietnamese relations, and section 5 concludes.  
 
From Central Plan to Quasi-market Economy 
The Vietnamese economy was until recently dominated by traditional rice-based 
agriculture. Under French colonial rule, agriculture was the backbone of the economy, with 
new export crops being introduced such as coffee, tea, and rubber. After the French colonial 
and re-invasion period in 1954, Vietnam’s national economy developed in two separated 
regions. The socialist North became a centralized plan-economy based on collective 
ownership, while the South developed a fairly free-market economy with little government 
involvement.  When Vietnam was reunited in 1975, the central plan-economy was extended 
throughout the country. Industrial development focused on heavy industry and import-
substitution policies, while poor management of the economy led to stagnation rather than 
growth.  
From the late 1970s until 1990, Vietnam was integrated in the trading system of the 
Soviet Union and its allies, with few other linkages. In the 1980’s, Vietnam experienced 
severe shortages of food and basic consumer goods, a high budget deficit, three-digit 
inflation, chronic trade imbalances and deteriorating living standards. Therefore, in 1986 the 
Vietnamese government initiated an overall economic renewal policy - popularly known as 
“Doi Moi”. Since then, the Vietnamese economy has gradually from a command- economy 
toward a market economy (van Arkadie and Mallon, 2003). 
 
Liberalization and Stabilization 
Liberalization has been a gradual process that is still ongoing. Prices and domestic 
trade have been liberalized, the double price system has been abolished, and import and 
export restrictions have been greatly reduced. Gradually, Vietnam has moved from state 
monopoly on foreign trade to free trade, and from import-substitution to export-oriented 
 3
policies. Domestic businesses obtained the right to export and import within their registered 
scope of business, and foreign trading companies have been allowed to set up branches and 
representative offices in the country. 
Both tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade have been reduced and/or eliminated. 
Import duties have been substantially reduced while most export products are exempt from 
export taxes. Most commodities and goods can now be freely imported into and exported. 
The number of products subject to export or import prohibition or restriction has been 
reduced. Government approvals of contracts and prices as well as licenses for lot shipments 
are no longer required.  
The banking system has been reformed into a two-tier system by separating the 
central bank from commercial banks, and by opened for the entry of private banks. Multiple 
exchange rates have been replaced with a single floating rate. Interest rate and foreign 
exchange controls have been relaxed, while tight monetary policy has kept inflation low. 
Rather than printing money to cover budget deficits, as done previously, the government has 
issued bonds and treasury bills to finance the public sector deficit. Moreover, a stock market 
was established in late 2000 to mobilize private savings for investment. 
The state budget has been decentralized, encouraging responsibility of local 
authorities, and restructured to remove state subsidies. The tax system has been reformed 
with the broadening of the tax base and the introduction of new taxes such as a VAT and a 
business income tax to replace the turnover tax and profit tax respectively. 
 
Economic Performance 
As a consequence of these comprehensive reforms, Vietnam pulled itself out of the 
deep social and economic crisis of the late 1980’s. Inflation was reduced from 3 digit 
numbers in the late 80s to single digit numbers in the 90s, and has been kept low. The GDP 
has doubled in the decade of 1990s and is showing further rapid growth in the 21st Century.  
Most of the economic growth has been generated in the industrial sector, but also 
services have expanded rapidly (Figure 1). The industrial sector (including construction) has 
been growing by an annual average of 10.4% since 1990 and contributed 39% of Vietnam's 
GDP in 2003. A large part of this growth can be attributed to foreign investment, and more 
recently, the development of the local private sector. The service sector constitutes almost 
39% of GDP, and has been growing by an annual average of 7.3% since 1990. The primary 
sector has been growing by 4% annually over the 1990s (Statistics Publishing House, 2004). 
With agricultural modernization, Vietnam has turned from a food-importing nation into the 
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second largest exporter of rice in the world. However, agriculture still accounts for 22% of 
Vietnam's economic output, and over two-thirds of employment, primarily on small family 
farms. 
 
Figure 1: GDP Growth by Sector
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003*
Th
ou
sa
nd
 B
ill
io
n 
V
ie
tn
am
es
e 
D
on
g 
(c
on
st
an
t 1
99
4 
pr
ic
es
)
Agriculture, Forestry, Aquaculture Industry and Construction Services
 
Data source: Statistics Publishing House, 2004 
 
Throughout the 1990’s, exports expanded significantly, growing by over 20% in some 
years. At the end of the decade, exports accounted for 40% of GDP, an impressive 
performance in a recovering Asia. However, exports and imports are closely related as a large 
part of Vietnamese manufacturing is processing imported materials for exports; in other 
words, Vietnam is contributing the labor-intensive stages within complex global supply 
chains. Policy-initiatives aimed to limit control Vietnam’s import growth, and in 1999, the 
balance-of-payments even generated a surplus, as robust trade performance combined with 
official development assistance and remittances from overseas Vietnamese.  
The Asian crisis of 1997 had only a moderate effect on Vietnam because the 
economy, and financial markets in particular, were less internationally integrated, and 
businesses were not as highly leveraged as in the crisis economies. The impact was more 
indirect, for instance FDI inflows slowed down due to scarcity of capital in key source 
countries such as Korea. Government control of the economy and a nonconvertible currency 
have protected Vietnam from a more severe impact. However, the crisis, coupled with the 
loss of momentum from the first round of economic reforms has exposed structural 
inefficiencies in Vietnam's economy that had to be addressed in a new wave of reforms.  
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At the onset of the new millennium, the Vietnamese economy keeps developing at an 
rapid pace, despite major economic and environmental challenges such as SARS and Avian 
Flu. Economic growth accelerated from 6.7% in 2000 to 6.9% in 2001, 7.0% in 2002 and 
7.2% in 2003. The target for 2004 has been 8.0%, which would be one of the highest GDP 
growth rates in Asia and thus the world. In consequence, the World Bank, IMF, Asian 
Development Bank and other international institutions have praised Vietnam for its successes 
in poverty reduction and alleviation (World Bank, 2004a). 
Exports continued to increase at a high growth rate of 21% in 2003. helped by the 
strong performance of exports to the USA, which grew by over 60 percent from a low base. 
Especially garments exports are fast growing, contributing over 50% of exports to the USA, 
with further growth expected with Vietnam’s WTO membership. Seafood has been 
developed into a new export success and account for 11 percent of non-oil exports (Ministry 
of Trade of Vietnam, 2004). Moreover, high world market prices for agricultural 
commodities such as coffee and rubber also help the recent surge in export values.  
Despite strong exports, the trade deficit rose to nearly 7 % of GDP in 2003 as imports 
were rising due to robust domestic investment and for inputs for exports production. 
Investment rose more than one percentage point to reach 35.6 % of GDP in 2003, with 
imports of capital goods growing by 41 %. Meanwhile, international reserves increased to 
US$ 5.6 billion on the back of rising ODA and FDI flows. Increasing reserves combined with 
investment driven imports ensure that the current account deficit should not be a major 
concern (World Bank, 2004b).  
Inflation has come down steadily in 2003, averaging about 3 percent for the year, but 
rose to 9.5% in 2004 as a result of rising import prices following the depreciation of the US 
Dollar, to which the Vietnamese Dong is closely aligned. While the increase in food prices 
may be temporary, the rise in oil prices may have knock-on effects. Expectations of rising 
inflation forced the government to cut the tariff on steel in a bid to bring down prices, and the 
public utilities delayed increases tariffs for power and water. 
 
State sector and privatization 
A key element in Vietnam’s economic renewal has been the reduction of the state 
intervention in business and the reform the state sector. state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have 
been stripped of most subsidies and other privileges, while individual firms have been given 
greater autonomy and operate as one-owner limited liability companies. SOEs have been 
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reorganized and their number dropped from 12,297 units in 1989 to around 5,300 units in 
2001 through mergers and dissolution (VCCI, 2004).  
Throughout the reform period, SOEs have been growing almost as rapidly as other 
sectors of the economy – quite in contrast to SOEs in other transition economies. Thus, the 
contribution of SOEs to GDP remained fairly stable (Table 1), and the state sector continues 
to be the largest sector of the economy. Similarly, household businesses have remained 
strong especially in agriculture, trading and other services, while foreign owned businesses 
rapidly increased their contribution to Vietnamese GDP.  
 
Table 1: GDP structure from 1994 to 2003, by ownership of firms, in percent. 
     1994 1995  2000 2001 2002 2003 
State-owned enterprises  40.1 40.2  38.5 38.4 38.3 38.0 
Collective enterprises 10.2 10.1  8.6 8.1 8.0 7.8 
Private enterprises 3.1 3.1  3.4 3.7 3.9 4.0 
Household business 35.9 36.0  32.3 31.8 31.4 33.0 
Mixed domestic enterprises 4.4 4.3  3.9 4.2 4.5 3.1 
Foreign invested enterprises  8.4 6.3  13.3 13.8 13.9 14.1 
Total 100 100  100 100 100 100 
Source: Statistics Publishing House, various years 
 
Vietnam has no large-scale privatization program comparable to those in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Rather, ownership in state enterprises is gradually being transferred to 
private owners in a process called ‘equitization’. In most cases, the new owners are insiders 
of the firm and acquired their equity stake in a process resembling a management-employee 
buyout, with favorable conditions for employees. Concentration of ownership in the hands of 
outside private owners is not encouraged, especially with regard to foreign investors. This is a 
common phenomenon at early stages of privatization processes, yet as a consequence the 
reforms fail to generate powerful new incentives that would induce managers to pursue deep 
restructuring strategies.  
Acceleration of the privatization process is official government policy, and in the 
2001 – 2005 period more than two thousand SOE are scheduled for equitization. This is 
expected to include electricity, post and telecommunications, chemicals, metallurgy, and 
banking and insurance sectors. Yet, whether the equitization of these larger SOEs and banks 
will actually lead to efficient governance with protection of outside investors depends on the 
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legal and regulatory framework that is being developed at the same time. Varying policies 
have been issued to enhance transparency and financial accountability, and to achieve 
effective corporate governance. Equitization will be undertaken openly and valuation of 
enterprises’ assets shall be based on market values, and foreign investors are encouraged to 
buy shares up to 30% individually (VCCI, 2005). This may lead to opportunities for the 
private sector, and foreign investors, to participate in the process. 
 
Entrepreneurs   
Private business development was not a priority during the early stages of Doi Moi. In 
the mid 1990’s, market institutions were still inadequate for entrepreneurship: banks almost 
exclusively served state-owned enterprises; there were no credit reporting bureaus; and courts 
able to enforce contracts between private businesses were just being created. Among 
entrepreneurs interviewed by McMillan and Woodruff (1999), less then 10% said that courts 
or the government could enforce contracts, and just 10% said that they received credit to start 
businesses. In consequence, entrepreneurs relied to a very high extend on building 
relationships with specific suppliers and customers (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999).  
Regardless of the above difficulties, the early reforms of doi moi triggered a boom in 
entrepreneurship. The new market opportunities have encouraged many people, including the 
poor and former state employers, to challenge their fate, and to develop various kinds of 
business. While many of them may have failed, there are many success stories of this early 
generation of entrepreneurs. The small entrepreneurship of the 1990’s has also been 
important for capital and skill accumulation, and thus created an important foundation for 
later development.  
Since 1999, government policy has shifted toward developing and supporting private 
businesses, and entrepreneurship in particular. The Company Law of 2000 has created a more 
conducive environment for entrepreneurs to run their business as a formally registered 
enterprise. Thus, entry by new firms has surged and within three years after the law came into 
effect; 55,793 new private enterprises were registered, a significant number compared to the 
45,000 enterprises registered between 1990 and 1999. These new firms mobilized capital of 
about 6.7 billions US$, more than the recorded FDI in the same period (CIEM 2004). The 
emergence of a large number of private firms has greatly contributed to the dynamism of the 
new market economy.  
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International Integration 
The enhanced integration of Vietnam in the international economy through 
membership international organizations and bilateral agreements greatly facilitates both trade 
and investment. In 1995, Vietnam became a member of ASEAN (Association of the South 
East Asian Nations), which has created a free trade area known AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade 
Area). This membership permits the free flow of goods within the economic area without 
substantial tariffs, and has thus created a larger market for products manufactured in 
Vietnam. Moreover, the ASEAN countries are negotiating with China, Japan and other 
countries about new free trade zones. Vietnam may thus serve as a gateway to a free trade 
region of more than 500 million people and a bridge to a massive market of 1.3 billion 
Chinese consumers. 
Relations with multilateral financial organizations such as the World Bank, IMF, Asia 
Development Bank and other multinational and national donor organizations have resumed or 
expanded. During the 1996-2001 period, the international community committed to provide 
Vietnam with Official Development Aid (ODA) of nearly US$ 20 billion, of which 35% has 
been disbursed (Ministry of Planning and Investment, 2002). This ODA provides direct 
business opportunities for foreign investors contracting with multilateral and national aid 
organizations, e.g. for consultancy and construction projects, as a large share of ODA is 
provided for technical assistance and training.  
Vietnam is negotiating the accession into World Trade Organization (WTO), and 
expects to be accepted as full member at the general assembly at the end of 2005. 
Membership in the WTO will further enhance the institutional development of Vietnam, and 
create more stable and transparent trade and investment relationships with countries 
worldwide. Membership in the WTO would facilitate both exporting from Vietnam 
production facilities and entry to the Vietnamese market. At the same time, competition is 
likely to get tougher as more foreign importers and investors enter the market. 
 
Infrastructure 
The quality of infrastructure in major cities such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City has 
vastly improved.  Power outages still occur but the privations of life ten years ago are largely 
gone.  Cranes dominate the skylines of Vietnam’s major cities, and roads and ports are being 
upgraded or newly built all across the country. Telecom infrastructure is improving and 
prices are coming down. Also secondary aspects of infrastructure that are of concern to 
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expatriates, such as good restaurants, well stocked supermarkets, and international schools 
are generally available in the larger cities.  
However, infrastructure development has been very unequal. In the rural areas, the 
infrastructure still leaves much to be improved and investors need to be aware of this. Power 
outages and water stoppages are common, which may greatly reduce productivity. Industrial 
parks are, however, now more widely dispersed and although some may exist primarily on 
paper, as the infrastructure has not been completed yet. However, foreign investors have a 
rapidly expanding choice of alternative investment sites across the country. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment  
 
Recent Trends  
Since 1987, Vietnam has been very successful in attracting FDI . Indeed, FDI has 
been an important contributor to economic transition, business liberalization and macro-
economic growth over the past decade. It is hard to envisage doi moi without FDI activity. 
Foreign investors created an imported ‘private sector’ for a country that only had a fledgling 
private sector of its own at the beginning of the 1990s. With advantages of low distance and 
cultural similarity, neighboring countries such as Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan 
set their footholds in Vietnam early after its open door policy. These countries alternatively 
top rankings of FDI in Vietnam.  
Although foreign-invested companies employed less than 1% of the total workforce in 
Vietnam, they cumulatively accounted for around 27% of the country’s (non-oil) exports, 
35% of the country’s total industrial output, they constituted almost 13% of Vietnam’s GDP, 
and contributed around 25% of total tax revenues (Vietnam Investment Review, 2001).  
In 2003, FDI reached 3.1 billion USD, an increase of 11% over 2002, and further 
increases were reported in 2004. As of mid-November 2004, the country recorded already 
US$3.5 billion, which brings Vietnam onto the third rank in attracting FDI in South-East 
Asia, substantially behind Singapore and Malaysia, but running neck and neck with Thailand. 
Thus FDI is turning to Vietnam despite the global downturn in FDI and fierce competition for 
FDI worldwide. 
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Figure 2: FDI trends 
Figure 2: Volume of FDI in Vietnam: 1988 to 2003
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Source: FDI Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment 
 
Table 2: cumulative FDI by sector, 1988-2004  
Sector 
Number 
projects  
Implemented 
capital  
Million US$ Sector 
Number 
projects  
Implemented 
capital  
Million US$ 
Oil & gas (offshore) 27 4,435 Services 993 6,614
Aquaculture 105 150
Transportation, post & 
telecommunication 144 918
Agro-forestry 595 1,549 Hotel and tourism 166 2,199
Construction 293 2,038 Finance and banking 56 632
Manufacturing 3,041 11,878
Culture, education and 
health 179 342
   Food & beverage 230 2,038 Office-apartment building 104 1,612
   Light industry 1,411 3,362 IZ&EPZ development 20 521
   Heavy industry 1,476 6,588 Other services 321 337
Source: FDI Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment 
 
Over US$ 10 billion, or 40% of FDI capital, and 60% of FDI projects are in 
manufacturing sectors (Table 2), which is considerably higher than in other emerging 
economies (Estrin & Meyer 2004). Service industries attracted US$ 6.5billion or a quarter of 
FDI capital, with hotel and tourism and office building management attractive the largest 
shares among services. In addition, the construction sector attracted US$ 1.9 billion, 
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indicative of the building boom in Vietnam. US$ 4.4 billion went into offshore oil and gas 
extraction projects.  
FDI projects are registered in 4 different forms. The largest share in the FDI stock by 
the end of 2004 are 100% foreign owned projects, with implemented capital of US$ 9 billion 
and 3609 projects. JV accounts for US$ 10.4 billion and 1229 project. Minor share go into 
business contracts (US$ 5.1 billion) or in build-operate-transfer contracts (US$ 0.9 billion.  
Leading source countries are Japan (by capital invested) and Taiwan (by number of 
projects) followed by Korea and Singapore (Table 3). Thus, FDI in Vietnam is so far 
primarily and intra-Asian phenomenon. Within Vietnam, FDI is concentrated in the two main 
urban centers of Hanoi and Ho-Chi-Minh City (HCMC), followed by provinces near NCMC 
that took early leads in creating attractive local investment environments with investment in 
infrastructure, predictable local authorities and the creation of SEZs (Meyer & Nguyen, 
2005).  
 
Table 3: FDI by Source country and destination province, 1988-2004  
 
No.  
 Source countries 
or Teritories  
Number 
projects  
Implemented 
capital  
Million US$  No.   Destination  
Number 
projects  
Implemented 
capital  
Million US$ 
1  Japan     493  4253 1  HCMC        1.595 6078
2  Singapore        335  3381 2  (Oil sector)            27 4435
3  Taiwan      1.262  3146 3  Ha Noi           549 3702
4  South Korea        847  2889 4  Dong Nai           609 3613
5  Netherlands           53  1975 5  Binh Duong           913 1767
6  Hong Kong         326  1942 6  Ba ria - Vung tau           110 1398
7  BritishVirginIsl.          212  1141 7  Hai phong           165 1252
8  France         142  1061 8  Vinh Phuc             73 443
9  Malaysia          164  811 9  Thanh Hoa             15 411
10  Thailand         116  757 10  Kien Giang               9 394
11  United States         215  730 11  Hai Duong             66 368
12  Mauritius            13  627 12  Quang Ninh             69 308
13  United Kingdom           62  600 13  Long An              85 306
14  Switzerland           28  519 14  Khanh Hoa             54 292
15  Cayman Islands           11  399 15  Ha Tay             36 261
16  Australia          103  360 16  Phu Tho             40 195
17  Sweden           10  239 17  Tay Ninh             71 180
18  Bermuda              5  213 18  Da Nang             61 166
19  Russia           45  187 19  Bac Ninh             29 145
20  China         316  175 20  Thua Thien - Hue             25 142
 Others 359 1,240   Other          528          917
 Total       5,129  26,773   Total       5,129 26,773
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Source: FDI Department, Ministry of Planning and Investment 
 
Government Policies toward FDI 
 The Vietnamese government still pursues more interventionist industrial policy than 
most other emerging markets. This includes indicative five-year plans and yearly priorities 
for industrial development and investment. At the time of writing, government policy is in 
particular concerned with promoting sectors such as telecommunications, software 
development, and shipbuilding. For instance, the government launched in 2000 and grand 
plans to invest in IT infrastructure, which should lead to vastly enhance telecommunication 
services. Software development is targeted as new sector that may utilize Vietnam’s human 
capital in technical fields, and is supported by an ambitious e-government initiative. 
Influential circles in the government promote the shipping industry as Vietnam aims to 
compete with South Korea in the labor-intensive segments of shipbuilding. Foreign investors 
serving these industries may thus find particularly fast growing markets, attractive incentives, 
and easier access to business licenses. For instance, several small Danish niche producers of 
ship components are said to be touring Vietnam in view of expected business opportunities.  
In the wake of increasing competition for foreign investment in South-East Asia, the 
Vietnamese government provides many investment incentives. Corporate income tax is low 
compared to other countries in the region (Since January 2004, the standard rate is 28 % and 
preferential rates range from 10% to 20%). Foreign investors can be exempted from import 
duties to create fixed assets, such as machinery, means of transport, and construction 
materials that are not produced locally. Further exemptions are available for raw materials, 
spare parts, parts and materials imported for production of goods for export. Moreover, 
foreign investors may carry their losses forward for up to five years. 
The legal framework still provides for different treatment of enterprises in some 
respect, giving more favorable conditions to domestic rather than foreign-owned firms, and to 
state-owned rather than private firms. This is, however, recognized as an obstacle to business 
development and to attracting further FDI. Thus, various initiatives are under way to 
harmonize the legal framework. For instance, the company laws for foreign and domestic 
firms are to be merged, land rental fees are to be leveled, a new competition law shall remove 
distinctions between types of firms, while new laws on technology transfer and intellectual 
property shall provide for better protection of the interests of foreign investors. Overall, this 
broad agenda for legal development can be expected to create a more level playing field. 
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However, the development and implementation of new laws is a time consuming process will 
take some time to complete.  
The development of the institutional framework is also pushed forward by the 
commitments that Vietnam made under international agreements, in particular bilateral 
agreements made in the run up to WTO membership. The central ministry responsible for 
foreign investors – MPI – is generally committed to implementing these legal obligations, but 
other function ministries of local authorities may be unaware or unwilling to smoothly 
implement new regulations. The departmentalization of responsibilities between ministries 
can at time lead to contradictory requirements from different regulations. Foreign investors 
and their local partners may thus need to communicate to multiple authorities to make their 
case. In the words of one expatriate managing director, “if you know your ways around, you 
can get things done”. While legislative issues may be cumbersome, they are much improved 
in recent years, and this trends is generally expected to continue.  
 Yet rules and regulation are set not only at the national level. Many responsibilities 
have been decentralized including approval control of investment licenses. This 
decentralization is a big step towards reducing bureaucracy and saving time for investors. The 
foreign investment law of 1996 provides provinces the authority to grant investment licenses 
for some FDI projects. Moreover, many regulatory functions, for instance concerning land 
lease, import and export licenses, and employment have been delegated (Nguyen et al. 
2004a).  
However, decentralization may also complicate institutional development. New 
legislation and regulation may be issued in Hanoi, but the communication and dissemination 
to the provinces is often not very effective. Thus, the implementation of laws and decrees at 
local level may not meet the intentions of the legislator, and be slow and inconsistent. In 
consequence, legal practices vary within the country and depend on for instance local tax 
authorities or customs offices (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). This causes particular challenges 
for businesses operating across the country, such as trading houses.  
Foreign investors generally have to negotiate with both local authorities as well as, for 
larger projects, with national authorities. Their treatment varies greatly across provinces, as 
some provinces have adapted policies and administrative procedures to attract foreign 
investors to the specific location. Thus, FDI is distributed very unequally with Ho-Chi-Minh 
City and neighboring provinces to the North attracting the bulk of greenfield FDI to newly 
established industrial zones, based on an institutional framework that is more favorable to 
FDI (Meyer & Nguyen 2005).  
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 Case Study: Ford 
Ford Vietnam is one of the largest FDI projects in Vietnam. It has been established 
in 1995 as a 102m USD joint-venture between Ford Motor Company of the USA (75%) and 
Song Cong Diesel Company of Vietnam (25%). The main factory is located in an industrial 
zone in Hai Duong, 50 km north of Hanoi, and came into operation in 1997. It was 
expanded twice, and became one of the most successful business in the emerging 
automobile sector, turning profitable after only three years of operation. In 2002, Ford sold 
3,685 vehicles worth about $95 million, in 2003 the sale increased to 5243 and for 11 
months of 2004, the company sold 4601 vehicles which corresponds to a market share of 
14%. In Nov 2004, Ford passed Toyota as the best selling vehicles of the month for the first 
time (Vnexpress news, 2004). 
This success has been achieved in a tightly regulated market. On the one hand, 
demand has been kept low due to low incomes, high vehicle taxes and lack of space on 
Vietnam’s roads. Thus automotive assembly for the Vietnamese market cannot achieve the 
scale economies common elsewhere in the car industry. On the other hand, Ford benefits 
from import protection1 and various tax privileges.2 Its success thus builds on Ford’s ability 
to assemble a wide range of models with reasonable productivity, low cost and good quality 
using relatively unspecialized assembly lines. Marketing and good services are believed to 
be key to win the customers Doing business with uncertain policy is also a skill for success. 
According to Ford Vietnam’s general director, Tim Tucker, despite situation an essentially 
frozen market for cars since the new tax law came into effect at the beginning of 2004, Ford 
Vietnam is maintaining production and business through intensive marketing and improve 
after sale services. Ford has launched new models, Ford Transit Limited and Ford Escape, 
to widen the choice for customers (Vneconomy, 2004). However, import liberalization in 
the context of the ASEAN Free Trade Zone and WTO membership will create competitive 
challenges for the by international standards relatively small plant in Hai Duong.  
 
                                                          
1 A tariff of 100% plus 80% of special sale tax are applied to the range of vehicles that Ford Vietnam is 
assembling while imported components are subject to only 6% to 26% tariff and special sale tax applied to local 
assembling vehicles is only up to 25%. 
2 Ford received a tax holiday for the first 4 years making profit and 50% reduction of tax in next four years. The 
corporate income tax is only 15% for the first 12 years of operation (1997) and 25% thereafter. These rates 
contracted have been contractually agreed before the new corporate tax law came in to effect, and still apply. 
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Partnering with Vietnamese companies 
The foreign investment law has been stepwise liberalized such as to permit majority 
foreign ownership, and opening up more sectors of industry to 100% foreign owned 
greenfield operations. However foreign investors often partner with a local firm, either 
because it is a legal requirement in the sector, or because local firms control crucial 
resources, such as distribution networks, relationships with government authorities, or land 
use rights, i.e. control over real estate (Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). Usually this collaboration 
is in form of a joint venture as acquisitions of local firms are still the exception. Yet joint 
ventures can be designed such that the local partner transfers its existing operations, and the 
foreign partner may over time buy out the local partner to attain 100% equity. 
Often, the local partner would be a state-owned firm because de novo private firms 
are only recently emerging as substantive players in the Vietnamese economy. Partnering 
with an SOE, however, creates special challenges for foreign investors (Nguyen and Meyer, 
2004). SOEs pursue a broader set of objectives and are subject to direct interferences from 
their governing authority, such as the pertinent ministry or provincial government. At the 
same time, management often has a high degree of de facto autonomy and may pursue 
personal as well as social objectives, while not being familiar with the governance structures 
and decision-making processes common is mature market economies. Thus, the internal 
decision processes of SOE partners often appear opaque to foreign investors. They may thus 
be well advised to draw up clear contracts concerning the roles and responsibilities of both 
partners.  
After establishing a joint venture, foreign investors face considerable challenges for 
knowledge sharing and organizational change in the local entity. Similar challenges would 
apply to foreign investors taking over local firms if and when restrictions on the acquisition 
of local firms are removed. Many Vietnamese SOE managers have an engineering education, 
and thus require modern management and leadership skills to lead change processes and 
implement new work processes and delegate decision-making and responsibilities. Foreign 
investors report good experiences with combining formal education with on the job training 
such as shadowing or rotating staff through other operations in South-East Asia, such as to 
provide practical experiences on how concepts and processes of the multinational firm can be 
implemented in an Asian context (Nguyen and Meyer, 2004).  
The rapid growth of the private sector in Vietnam has made the economy much more 
dynamic and market-oriented. This dynamics creates more investment opportunities and, at 
the same time, speeds up the process of implementing new business ideas. Some local private 
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firms can become attractive partners for foreign investors since they do not face the 
restructuring challenges of SOEs. However, a partnership with a private firm may not to same 
extent provide of local resources, which are often controlled SOEs. Moreover, the majority of 
private firms in Vietnam is small and has not developed transparent governance mechanisms. 
Many are managed in informal manner, with family control and following unwritten rules. 
Disputes are often resolved by informal means.  
The informal management style of private firms may enhance flexibility and reduce 
many transaction costs. This makes them quite attractive partners, especially in service 
sectors like restaurant business. In 1990s, many small businesses in food and beverage sector 
are owned and run by foreign investors under the legal base of Vietnamese businessperson. 
This form of partnership allows starting the business quickly with little investment and 
avoiding complex bureaucratic procedures faced by foreign investors. However, this is an 
uncertain type of partnership and might be easily broken down when things go wrong. 
Reform of FDI regulations can be expected to reduce transaction costs incurred by foreign 
investors and thus make informal partnerships less attractive. 
 
Marketing and Distribution 
With 80 million inhabitants, high population growth and fast rising per capita 
incomes, Vietnam offers a large potential market for consumer goods. Yet, accessing these 
potential customers still presents considerable challenges as the marketing and distribution 
infrastructure is not well developed.  
Sales potential exist both in price-competitive mass market, where economies of scale 
and efficiency of production and distribution are essential, and in the fast growing premium 
market of middle class consumers. The latter segment is particular attractive for foreign 
investors with global brands as Vietnamese consumers have a high appreciation of Western 
brands. Like for other Asian consumers, conspicuous consumption is important, that is 
consumers buy prestigious brands as status symbols and to impress their peers rather than 
purely due to their functional value. Many consumers associate quality of live with the 
consumption of branded products, and are willing to pay considerable premiums (Nguyen, 
2004). This creates low price sensitivity and high profit potential for well-positioned brands 
in the premium segment.  
However, to realize the earning potential in both mass markets and premium 
segments, foreign investors need to reach the local consumers, and thus make best use of an 
often weak marketing and distribution infrastructure. The sales and distribution channels used 
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to be a fragmented patchwork of state-owned import-export companies, private and state-
owned wholesalers, independent Vietnamese agents and distributors, small retail outlets, and 
kiosks. The formal distribution channels often overlap with parallel channels for smuggled 
and gray market goods. Independent stores still remain the most important distribution 
channel accounting for 75% of total volume sales in 2003, yet shopping malls and 
supermarkets such as Big C and German Metro are expanding in the major cities and account 
for an increasing share of sales, especially in premium segments. 
Marketing techniques have to be adapted to the needs and opportunities of the 
emerging market context (Dawar and Chattopadhaj, 2002). Opportunities for advertising on 
billboards, TV or print media are limited and expensive, and rarely allow targeting specific 
consumer segments like in industrialized economies. Thus, mass advertising and direct 
marketing techniques such as telemarketing and catalogue order business is still an alien 
concept to Vietnamese consumers. However, people-intensive sales techniques such as 
distributing samples, sales promotion or delivering even small volumes to small sales outlets 
and street vendors may be cost effective. For instance, leading brands of beer employ 
charming ladies dressed in skirts with brand logo who are based on-site in restaurants and 
pubs to encourage revelers to try their particular brand of beer. Similarly, some cosmetic and 
lingerie companies are experimenting with door-to-door sales. Thus, with low costs of sales 
staff, people-intensive marketing methods may be more efficient than capital-intensive 
techniques such as TV advertising. 
Importers would typically collaborate with local partners as foreigners legally cannot 
normally own independent stores without production in the country. Thus, franchising 
contracts have become popular for foreign consumer products and fast food eateries such as 
Swatch, Revlon, Baskin-Robbins, Kentucky Fried Chicken, Carvel Ice Cream and Texas 
Chicken. (Icon Group International, Inc., 2001). Also local franchising operators are 
emerging, such as Trung Nguyen coffee shops.  
 
Case Study: Carlsberg 
Carlsberg Breweries has been an early mover in the Vietnamese market, establishing 
two joint ventures in 1993. Both joint ventures have created new local brands that became 
very popular with Vietnamese consumers. At the same time, the global brand Carlsberg has 
been produced in Hanoi and targeted at the premium segment. These investments positioned 
Carlsberg well to take advantage of the growing beer market driven by increased per capita 
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beer consumption and population growth. Eventually, the JVs turned highly profitable, thus 
making up for losses in the early years (Nguyen et al. 2004b).  
The existing JV agreements, which impose more restrictions on Carlsberg than new 
investors in 2005 would have to accept, might occasionally constrain reorganization or 
growth of the business. Yet, with established business networks and high brand recognition, 
Carlsberg is well positioned to take on new challenges in a rapidly changing environment, 
including expanding production capacity and the anticipated entry of US brewer Anhaeuser-
Busch. In September 2004, a new marketing campaign was launched on the back of a global 
emerging-economies marketing-strategy that sharpens the positioning of the Carlsberg brand. 
In addition, the local brands are positioned to serve the high volume market, Halida flourishes 
in Hanoi, while Huda and Festival dominate the market in the old imperial town of Hue 
(Meyer & Tran 2004). 
 
Production for Export  
Vietnam has a comparative advantage for labor-intensive production processes that require a 
low or semi-skilled labor force. The minimum wage is set at US45 in HCMC and Hanoi, and 
lower in other provinces, though foreign investors typically pay more than this minimum. As 
global supply chains are increasingly disaggregating, and transportation costs are declining, 
multinational firms are locating each stage of the production process wherever conditions are 
most favorable. Vietnam is taking a specific position in these global supply chains, namely 
the manufacture labor-intensive products or parts. Typical industries for such export-oriented 
manufacture include textiles, footwear, furniture, and toys. In consequence, foreign 
investment contributed to the growth of exports of ‘unskilled labor intensive’ products, and 
created in particular employment for female production workers (Jenkins 2004).  
Foreign investors whom we interviewed for this research appreciate the Vietnamese 
workforce, relative to other in SE Asia because of high productivity and ability and 
willingness to learn, attention to detail and, related to this, design capabilities. In the words of 
a Vietnamese consultant, “Vietnamese are more creative, but no so disciplined as the 
Chinese – which has major implications for managing work forces”.  
An early mover utilizing Vietnam’s low labor costs has been sports-shoe maker Nike. 
In 1995, Nike began to shift production to Vietnam, where wages are around $50 a month, to 
lessen its dependence on China and Indonesia where they previously had their main 
production bases. In 1999, Nike products were manufactured in 12 factories partly under 
Nike’s ownership and partly under subcontracts. Directly or indirectly, Nike employed 
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43,000 workers that produced 22 million shoes annually and exported shoes and clothing for 
US$450 million 8% of Vietnam’s manufacturing exports (Hartmann & Wokutch, 2004). In 
2004, Nike reported 34 contract manufacturers in Vietnam, making Vietnam the sixth largest 
production base for the brand. These firms cluster in the South of Vietnam: 17 were in 
HCMC and 10 in neighboring Dong Nai province.  
Utilizing low labor costs in Vietnam does not require setting up an equity investment 
into a new production plant. Specialist subcontractors have developed that manufacture labor-
intensive products under European or North American brands brand names. This includes 
foreign-owned companies, especially from Taiwan and Korea, where raising labor costs have 
undermined the competitiveness of certain segments of industry.  
The policy framework encourages this type of export-oriented ventures. Exporters 
face fewer restrictions on foreign ownership and benefit from tariff exemption for imported 
materials. Moreover, industrial zones are developed with the specific needs of export oriented 
manufacturing in mind, notably in the provinces Dong Nai and Binh Duong, north of Ho-Chi-
Minh City. Government policy is however shifting towards attracting foreign investment that 
utilizes not only low-skilled labor but also makes use of technical skills available in Vietnam.  
However, the manufacture of labor-intensive products in Vietnam has also attracted 
the attention of NGOs concerned with the labor practices in so-called sweatshops. Following 
some scandals in the late 1990s, major global brands manufacturers have taken major 
initiatives to raise labor standards not only in their own factories but throughout their supply 
chain (Hartman & Wokutch, 2004). The Vietnamese labor law reflects basic workers rights – 
true to the socialist roots. However, enforcement has at times been a major concern, though 
foreign investment companies tend to be monitored more regularly. Beyond legal standards, 
foreign business community in Vietnam is contributing to initiative to raise awareness and 
understanding for broader health, safety and environmental issues, for instance via the 
‘business links initiative’ (Hartman & Woktuch, 2004).  
 
Case Study: Asama Yuh Jiun 
Asama Yuh Jiun, a Taiwanese bicycle manufacturer, established a 15m USD, 100% 
foreign owned company in 1999. The factory has grown into Asama’s largest production site 
and exports bicycles to Japan, the EU and Canada under its own brand or buyer's brands. 
Increasing production costs in Taiwan and Japan induced Asama to seek a lower cost site for 
its production facilities. Mr. Feng, the current General Manager of Asama Vietnam, toured a 
shortlist of countries in South-East Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
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Vietnam. He choose Vietnam for a new production site because he concluded that Vietnam 
has many similarities with Taiwan 30 years ago, the culture is familiar, the infrastructure is 
fairly good and labor costs are relatively low. His decision to locate in Binh Duong, a 
Southern province near HCMC, was based on the welcoming and supporting attitute and 
actions of the province's leardership, which had won his trust.  
In 2004, Asama Vietnam employed about 1000 workers with some Taiwanese and 
Chinese technicians. With these well-trained workers, ISO management and automatic 
machineries, the company aimed at producing one million bicycles annually in Vietnam. The 
factory accommodated four bicycle assembly lines, nine frame welding lines; automatic anti-
rust treatment; automatic painting equipments which include electrostatic liquid painting and 
powder coating; electro-deposit equipments and three sets of automatic wheels building and 
spoke-adjusting machines. The company became the largest bicycle manufacturer in 
Vietnam, and in a process of localization of suppliers, it helped nine Taiwanese 
manufacturers of bicycle components to set up factories in Vietnam. 
 
Managing Businesses in Vietnam 
 
Business Culture  
Vietnamese culture is in many ways similar to Chinese culture, and foreign 
businesspersons may as a first approximation act like they would in China. However, 
Vietnamese culture is in many subtle ways in different from Chinese culture, and repeat-
visitors should develop an understanding of the specific traits of Vietnamese culture. 
Moreover, most Vietnamese do not appreciate to be reminded of the cultural affinity to their 
powerful and at times hostile neighbor.  
Like other Asian countries, Vietnam has a ‘high context’ culture, which implies that 
words spoken may vary in their meaning depending on the context, and people maintain close 
relationships over a long period of time. Many aspects of behavior are not made explicit 
because most members know what to do and what to think from years of interaction with 
each other. Thus, situation, place, attitude, non-verbal behavior, and gestures moderate the 
meaning of spoken words. 
A formal greeting in Vietnamese is quite complicated, as one has to address persons 
differently depending on their gender, relation with the speaker and the age difference. It is 
hard to remember this jungle of pronouns and easy to be embarrassed if one gets it wrong. 
Also, there is no need to say greetings in Vietnamese as most of business partners or 
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government officials meeting foreign visitors would speak English or have an interpreter. 
Therefore, foreign visitors may either make it precise or avoid it, unless they wanted to create 
some humor for a friendly start. A handshake with a friendly smile while bowing your head 
slightly to show respect would usually be enough. 
Business cards are usually exchanged at the first meeting. Vietnamese names can be a 
little tricky for Westerners as it starts out with family name, then comes one or more middle 
name and lastly comes a given name. As only the given name is used in both formal and 
informal contexts, when given a business card, one should quickly look at the last name in the 
long row to identify the person’s name. The family name will not ring any bell if used to 
address someone since thousands of people share the same name.3  
While punctuality is not typical for casual meetings, it is very important for business 
meetings especially with government agencies. Traditionally, meetings were a series of long 
speeches rather than relaxed conversations, but this may be changing as more and more 
Vietnamese businesspeople and officials have exposure to Western business practices. The 
first meeting is always the most formal in this regard, with subsequent meetings taking on a 
much more relaxed tone. Hosts and guests take their seats on opposite sides of a long table. 
Opening the meeting, Vietnamese prefer with informal information: the impression about 
Vietnam, introduction of yourself and your firm. This introduction is important to the 
Vietnamese, who are often reluctant to commit to anything until they know a little their 
business partner. At this stage, patience is important. Requests for serious help are better 
saved for the second meeting. 
It is common for a drink to be offered to the visitor. Usually, the hosts offer what they 
have instead of asking what the visitor likes, as is the practice in the west. The traditional 
drink is green tea but visitors may be offered mineral water or a soft drink instead. Do not 
feel obliged to finish your drink if you are not thirsty. 
Meetings generally last about an hour, although there are many exceptions to this rule.  
It should not be surprising if Vietnamese party brings a number of additional people to a 
meeting, including perhaps one or two silent members who merely take notes.  
It is common in Vietnam for gifts to be exchanged on certain occasions to express 
respect, appreciation or gratitude. Gifts are usually exchanged at the end of meetings or 
                                                          
3 However, beware that Vietnamese living abroad or writing for international audiences, like this paper, 
commonly invert their names. Taking the co-authors of this paper as an example, Danish resident Ms. Yen Thi 
Thu Tran would be Tran Thi Thu Yen in her country of origin. Nguyen Vo Hung would be addressed as ‘Mr. 
Hung’ in Vietnam, but in compiling a list of references in Western style with family name and initials, he 
becomes Nguyen, H.V. Note moreover that in our bibliography Nguyen, M.T.T., Nguyen, T.H. and Nguyen, 
H.V. are not related, nor are Tran, C.A., and Tran, Y.T.T. 
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parties. Only small gifts, such as a company tie, and handicraft item or a book on your 
country, are necessary. 
Vietnamese officials meet a large number of foreign investors who never return. 
Foreign investor can ensure that their interests are kept in mind by repeat meetings and thus 
demonstrating the sincerity of their intentions. This would differentiate them from other 
foreigners who just come and talk without real investment plan.  
Like other Asian cultures, Vietnamese are very hospitable and avoid to say ‘no’ or to 
indicate negative attitudes. Warmth and enthusiasm of the Vietnamese counterparts may not 
indicate their level of interest but merely be a polite courtesy to the visitor and should not be 
taken to indicate the level of interest. Vietnamese also place a great deal of importance on 
saving face. Thus, ‘yes’ may merely imply ‘I am listening’. Compared to other Asian 
countries, Vietnamese are proud people and treating them with respect and courtesy will go a 
long way. 
Contacting the right partner is essential for successful business in Vietnam. 
Traditionally, many foreign investors were advised to go through a well-connected local 
partner to contact the right person or and set up a meeting with influential people. However, 
according to Henrik Andersen, CEO of Carlsberg in Vietnam, this is not necessarily the case 
any more, many intermediates will just confuse the process especially those who either do not 
know the contact directly or complicate the issue to gain credit. Government officials are 
generally bureaucratic but friendly to foreigners, thus they are always willing to meet when 
one present a decent request. Moreover, as Vietnam is competing with its neighboring 
countries to lure foreign capital and aims to present an attractive investment climate, officials 
would generally be pleased to receive potential investors. Trade associations and embassies 
are generally very helpful and provide advice on business practices, including frank 
comments on the business culture (box 1).  
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Box 1: Managing cultural differences: Advice from the Danish Embassy 
Even though private businesses in Vietnam have dramatically increased in recent years, a great part 
of Vietnamese businesses are still owned and controlled by the government or local authorities.  In 
the state owned enterprises conservatism is prevalent, and the top management often consist of 
political appointees with limited commercial experience. The private business community 
constitutes a broad range – from creative ‘amateurs’ to highly professional business managers. 
 
As elsewhere a personal network is essential for doing business in Vietnam.  Danish exporters and 
investors are advised to give high priority to establishing networks with Vietnamese counterparts. In 
the initial phase of market penetration it will in most cases be necessary with frequent visits to the 
partner (s).  Apart from potential partners the network will in most cases include key persons in the 
public administration.  Therefore, it is useful to pay courtesy calls and maintain contact to local 
authorities and business organisations from the very beginning. 
 
English language is becoming more common among business people and public officials.  Even if 
they fully understand English, at formal meetings they will prefer to speak Vietnamese.   
 
In general the Vietnamese counterparts are informal and helpful towards foreigners.  They are also 
tolerant towards visitors, who are not familiar with Vietnamese customs. However, a polite manner 
towards Vietnamese counterparts is strongly advised. It is considered rude and embarrassing to 
show anger or even impatience. 
 
In situations where disagreements occur the Vietnamese will often present their views in an indirect 
non-confrontational manner. However, it is extremely important to ensure that contracts or other 
commercial agreements do not contain unclear wording that may be subject to interpretation.  It is 
often very time consuming and expensive to resolve situations, if they merge into an open conflict, 
involving arbitration. 
 
Source: website of the Embassy of Denmark (accessed Jan 1st, 2005).  
Informal business practices 
Despite strong macroeconomic performance, the business community is still 
concerned about shortcomings in the legal and institutional framework. State ownership is 
still dominant, and issues like informal business practices or land leasing still cause 
headaches to foreign investors. Informality creates administrative and financial burdens for 
firms, and moreover an uneven playing field for different business sectors. Businesses of 
different ownership types and sizes are treated unequally, which creates incentives to create 
sub-optimal contractual arrangements and encourages informality. In consequence, private 
and smaller enterprises face more difficulties in accessing bank financing, land, and other 
critical resources (Tenev, et al., 2003).  
Like in other Asian countries, business practices such as networking, reverse 
commissions, and even bribes are still common. For instance, South Korea's Daewoo Group 
emerged as Vietnam's single biggest investor in early 90s after it tied up with electronics firm 
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Hanoi Electric. The latter's general director became the city's top official, which eased 
Daewoo's path through the bureaucratic maze (Asiaweek, 1995). 
However, government policy recognizes corruption as a social evil and a threat to the 
investment environment. Thus, in July 2004, Vietnam endorsed the regional Anti-Corruption 
Action Plan initiated by Asian Development Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). The initiative gained even more importance in light of 
the signing of the UN Convention against Corruption and the international anti-corruption 
agenda that resulted from this. The ADB-OECD action plan is deemed the key instrument to 
assist Asia-Pacific countries in implementing the UN Convention against Corruption. Prime 
Minister Phan Van Khai promised that fighting corruption in the state apparatus would be his 
main focus before his retirement in 2007. "Prevailing corruption is distorting and destroying 
the state machine" (Vietnam Investment Review, 2004). 
Informal business practices, such as corruption, tend to work against foreign investors 
who have less extensive local networks. Yet, foreign investors can also use local informal 
institutions to their advantage. Foreign investors establishing an amicable relationship with 
the local authorities find it easier to solve bureaucratic obstacles if and when they occur. 
Relations with local and central authorities can be developed as (potentially) cooperative 
relationships, and networking and building personal relationships is recommended. Gifts to 
the appropriate persons and their families may enhance the atmosphere and smooth the 
business process given that sending presents is part of traditional Vietnamese culture.  
 
US-Vietnamese Economic Relationships 
US government policies have until recently inhibited trade and investment in 
Vietnam. Only in 1994 the US economic embargo against Vietnam was lifted, and diplomatic 
relations were re-established the following year. In recent years, US policy took a more 
positive attitude towards Vietnam, as war related issues – on the one hand persons ‘missing in 
action’, on the other hand compensation for long-term consequences of chemical warfare 
(napalm) – were tuned down in the official policy agendas. The US - Vietnam Bilateral Trade 
Agreement (BTA) that came into effect in December 2001 is the centerpiece of U.S. efforts 
to open Vietnam’s market and promote reform of its trade and investment regime. The BTA 
required Vietnam to eliminate a broad array of non-tariff barriers to U.S. exports, 
significantly cut tariffs on many goods of special interest to the U.S., especially agricultural 
items. Moreover, the BTA should provide effective protection and enforcement of U.S. 
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intellectual property rights, open the Vietnamese market to U.S. services providers, and 
create fair and transparent rules and regulations for U.S. investors. 
Following the BTA, trade between the two nations boomed. The first nine-months 
export volume increased from US$ 736 million in 2001 to US$ 3.8 billion in 2004, making 
the USA the biggest market for Vietnamese exports (Vietnam News, 2004). However, trade 
relations have repeatedly been clouded by the legal disputes over for instance catfish and 
shrimp. The main items of Vietnam exports to the US are garments, seafood, footwear, crude 
oil, furniture and handicraft items. The main items that the United States exports to Vietnam 
are aircraft and spare parts, machinery and industrial products. At the third anniversary of the 
BTA, direct flights between the two countries were resumed after nearly 30 years.  
Some leading US brands moved in early to establish footholds in the Vietnamese 
market. For instance, Coca-Cola returned to Vietnam in 1994 within 24 hours after the lifting 
of the U.S. trade embargo. However, US investment in Vietnam remained low apart from 
some service multinationals, e.g. in the IT sector, and a few worldwide brands (Nguyen et al., 
2004a). Only after the signing of BTA in 2001 did US FDI in Vietnam take off. In late 2004, 
US businesses invested in 209 projects, with a total capital of US$1.3 billion, ranking them 
11th amongst investor countries in Vietnam (Table 3). The invested capital may even be 
higher as some US investment projects are registered under an affiliate in Singapore or Hong 
Kong. The Vietnamese have an historical appreciation for American products and 
technology, and there is a huge yet-unrealized potential for American companies in sectors 
where quality or brand-recognition is the main driver for consumer behavior, notably the 
high-tech sector.  
Business associations are working to enhance US-Vietnamese business relations, and 
to remove administrative and regulatory barriers that remain on both sides. For example, the 
US-ASEAN Business Council and the US-Vietnam Business Council are working closely 
with officials in both Washington, DC and Hanoi to help facilitate Vietnam’s entry into the 
WTO. The types of associations and expatriate networks are moreover a useful source of 
practical information for new entrants. 
 
Conclusions 
After almost two decades of gradual reform, Vietnam is a mixed economy with a 
vibrant private and foreign investment sector competing in fast growing markets, yet also 
with state-controlled enterprises and remnants of central planning. Opportunities for 
international business arise both in the fast growing local market driven by rising incomes 
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and population growth, and based on the inexpensive low to medium skilled workforce. 
Moreover, specific investment opportunities arise in sectors prioritized by government policy 
such as telecommunications, software development and shipbuilding.  
For potential business partners in the USA, the BTA that came into effect in late 2001 
created a basis for trade and investment, and business flourished since. The international 
integration will be further enhanced with Vietnam’s WTO membership, which will create 
new business opportunities but also gradually erode the benefits for those that entered under 
earlier BTAs.  
Companies considering engaging in business with Vietnam will encounter a business 
culture that shares many traditions with other East Asian nations, and a legal framework that 
is incomplete but rapidly evolving. Thus, building personal relationships with potential 
business partners and careful analysis of the institutional framework governing the targeted 
industry may be appropriate first steps to prepare the business. 
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